Khalid Chraibi online

Khalid Chraibi

5 September 2007

SaudiDebate.com

Introduction

Muslim people regularly get puzzled at the inability of the Islamic calendar to predict precisely, well in advance, the day on which major Islamic events are to take place, such as the first day of ramadan, or eid al-fitr, or eid al-adha, or the first day of the new Islamic year. They may even get annoyed because they cannot arrange in advance such ordinary things as taking a few days off from work on such occasions, making hotel bookings or flight reservations, or avoiding to take business or trip commitments on such dates.

The Islamic calendar’s shortcomings are indeed severe, since the data it shows each month differs from one Muslim country to another, and the information it provides does not extend beyond the current month. For instance, the first day of « ramadan » 1427 corresponded to Saturday, September 23, 2006 in 20 countries ; Sunday, September 24 in 46 countries ; and Monday, September 25 in 5 countries. (1) This situation is in no way unusual, but can be observed every month.

Nowadays, the Muslims use the Gregorian calendar to meet all their needs, and only care about Islamic dates on momentous Islamic occasions. However, the Islamic calendar only lost its usefulness when Muslim theologians disconnected it from its astronomical, conceptual and methodological moorings, early in the 7th century. It could fulfill all the basic functions of a calendar, and meet all the needs of modern man, within the Muslim community, on a worldwide basis, if it were prepared using the applicable scientific concepts, methods and parameters developed in astronomy.

Cadi Ahmad Shakir, President of the Egyptian Supreme Court of the Shari’ah, explained in a famous 1939 study that there was absolutely no obstacle, on the theological level, to the establishment of such an Islamic calendar, using astronomical calculations. (2)

In 2004, renowned jurist Yusuf al-Qaradawi announced his full support to Shakir’s analysis and conclusions. (3) For its part, the Fiqh Council of North America (FCNA), acting independently, presented in 2006 an ingenious, well thought-out methodology which permits the adoption of a pre-calculated calendar, while meeting all the requirements of the Shari’ah (4).

Astronomical considerations

The lunar calendar is based on a year of 12 months adding up to 354.37 days. Each lunar month begins at the time of the monthly “conjunction”, when the Moon is located on a straight line between the Earth and the Sun. The month is defined as the average duration of a rotation of the Moon around the Earth (29.53 days). The astronomers formulated the convention, over two thousands years ago, that months of 30 days and 29 days would succeed each other, adding up over two successive months to 59 full days. This left only a small monthly variation of 44 mn to account for, which added up to a total of 24 hours (i.e. the equivalent of one full day) in 2.73 years. To settle accounts, it was sufficient to add one day every three years to the lunar calendar, in the same way that one adds one day to the Gregorian calendar, every four years.

The Islamic calendar, however, is based on a different set of conventions. When the Messenger was asked for a method to determine the beginning of the month of fasting, he recommended to the faithful to begin fasting with the observation of the new moon (on the evening of the 29th day of sha’aban) and to end fasting with the new moon (of the month of shawal). “If the crescent is not visible (because of the clouds), count to 30 days”.

Thereafter, each Islamic State proceeded with its own monthly observation of the new moon (or, failing that, awaited the completion of 30 days) before declaring the beginning of a new month on its territory, instead of using a pre-calculated calendar, as computed by professional astronomers.

But, the lunar crescent becomes really visible only some 18 hours after the conjunction, and only subject to the existence of a number of favourable conditions relative to weather, time, geographic location, as well as various astronomical parameters… According to the months and seasons, the favourable conditions of observation of the new moon will be met in different sites on Earth.

Theological considerations

The Qor’an prohibits nowhere the use of astronomical calculations for the establishment of a pre-calculated calendar. The procedure is therefore perfectly and undisputably licit. Numerous theologians in the early years of Islam saw no contradiction between the Messenger’s teachings and the use of astronomical calculations to determine the beginnings of lunar months. (5) The dynasty of Fatimids in Egypt used a pre-calculated calendar over a period of two centuries, between the 10th and 12th centuries, before a change of political regime reactivated the procedure of observation of the new moon.

But the majority of Muslim theologians insist nowadays that, no matter what, one can’t go against the Messenger’s teachings. They interpret his recommendation concerning the observation of ramadan’s new moon as if it were part of the fundamental Islamic dogma. It would be utterly wrong, in their view, to use a calendar based on the conjunction, because one would start fasting, end fasting, and celebrate all other important Islamic events about two days earlier than would be the case, if the procedure of observation of the new moon were applied.

However, many Islamic thinkers insist that the Messenger’s recommendation to the faithful was merely adapted to the culture of the times. It should not be confused with the acts of worship. (6)

The Saudi authorities must share this view, somehow, since the country gave up in 1999 the procedure of observation of the new moon, to substitute to it a procedure based on the calculation of the schedules of sunset and moonset at the coordinates of Mecca, on the evening of the 29th day of each month. If the sun sets before the moon, this signals the beginning of the new month. In the opposite case, the month-in-progress lasts 30 days. This procedure has little to do with the observation of the new moon. (7)

One should also note that, during long periods of Islamic history, the hadith under discussion was not interpreted to mean the visual observation of a new moon, but only the acquisition of information, according to credible sources, that the month had begun. This opens entirely different vistas in the discussion of this question. (6)

As for the hadith of the Prophet according to which the Bedouins can neither read nor count, and must thus avoid using (astronomical) calculations, Ibn Taymiya observes that the argument may have been justified at the beginning of the 7th century, but he questions whether it could still apply to Muslims centuries later, after they had been at the vanguard of development of scientific knowledge, including in the field of astronomy.

Sheikh Abdul Muhsen Al-Obaikan, a Councilor in the Ministry of Justice of Saudi Arabia, is clearly favourable to the use of modern technology to determine the beginning of months. He says : « Using the naked eye to determine the beginning and end of Ramadan is primitive in an age of modern science and technology. There is no other way to put it. It’s pure backwardness.” » (8)

Voir également sur Oumma.com le 15 mai 2006 : 1er muharram – calendrier lunaire ou islamique

La problématique du calendrier islamique *
Voir le texte de cet article sur Oumma.com le 2 février 2007

Khalid Chraibi

Dernière mise à jour : 4 février 2007

« Le soleil et la lune (évoluent) selon un calcul (minutieux) » (Coran, Ar-Rahman, 55 : 5) (1)

« C’est Lui qui a fait du soleil une clarté et de la lune une lumière, et Il en a déterminé les phases afin que vous sachiez le nombre des années et le calcul (du temps). » (Coran, Yunus, 10 : 5) (2)

« Les ulémas n’ont pas le monopole d’interprétation de la charia. Evidemment ils doivent être consultés au premier plan sur les questions de la charia. (Mais) ce ne sont pas eux qui font la loi religieuse, de même que ce ne sont pas les professeurs de droit qui font la loi, mais les parlements » (Ahmed Khamlichi) (3)

« Une conférence internationale s’est tenue au Maroc en novembre 2006 concernant l’adoption d’un calendrier islamique universel. Des astronomes d’Arabie Saoudite, d’Egypte, de Jordanie, des Emirats Arabes Unis, d’Iran, de Guinée, de Libye, du Maroc et des Etats-Unis y ont participé. A une très forte majorité, comprenant l’Arabie Saoudite, l’Egypte et l’Iran, les astronomes se sont mis d’accord sur le calendrier (adopté par le Conseil du Fiqh d’Amérique du Nord) qui peut être utilisé comme calendrier islamique universel. Le Maroc est disposé à l’adopter immédiatement. D’autres développements sur cette question seront publiés au fur et à mesure. » (Moonsighting.Com, 25 décembre 2006) (4)

Introduction

Depuis que l’usage du calendrier grégorien s’est généralisé dans les pays musulmans, après leur occupation par des puissances étrangères aux 19è et 20è siècles, le calendrier islamique s’est progressivement trouvé relégué à des fonctions de protocole et de représentation, qu’il assume essentiellement à l’occasion du 1er muharram, du 1er ramadan, de l’aïd el-fitr ou de l’aïd al-adha. Nul ne songerait, de nos jours, à dater un contrat, à faire des réservations de billets d’avion ou de chambres d’hôtel, ou à programmer une conférence internationale sur la base des données de ce calendrier.

En effet, ses dates sont associées à des jours différents dans différents Etats musulmans et il ne permet pas, à l’intérieur du même pays, de planifier d’activités au-delà du mois en cours.

A titre d’illustration, le 1er shawal 1426, jour de célébration de l’aïd el fitr, correspondait au mercredi 2 novembre 2005 en Libye et au Nigéria ; au jeudi 3 novembre dans 30 pays dont l’Algérie, la Tunisie, l’Egypte, l’Arabie Saoudite et une partie des Etats-Unis ; au vendredi 4 novembre dans 13 pays dont le Maroc, l’Iran, le Bangladesh, l’Afrique du Sud, le Canada, une partie de l’Inde et une partie des Etats-Unis ; et au samedi 5 novembre dans une partie de l’Inde. (4) Cet état des choses n’est nullement exceptionnel, mais se renouvelle chaque mois.

Pourtant, le calendrier lunaire, basé sur le calcul, est en mesure de remplir parfaitement toutes les fonctions que les sociétés modernes en attendent. Mais, suite à l’interprétation que les ulémas ont donnée à un célèbre hadith du Prophète sur le début des mois lunaires, le mois lunaire islamique s’est retrouvé déconnecté de ses fondements conceptuels et méthodologiques astronomiques, ce qui a rendu caduques les fonctions du calendrier musulman, qui ne peut pas être établi à l’avance. (5)

De nombreux penseurs islamiques et juristes de renom se sont sentis interpelés par cette situation et ont publié à diverses reprises, depuis le début du 20è s., des études qui prônent l’utilisation par la communauté musulmane d’un calendrier islamique basé sur le calcul, dont ils confirment et démontrent la licité. La célèbre étude du cadi Ahmad Shakir (1939) (6), aux conclusions de laquelle le professeur Yusuf al-Qaradawi s’est dernièrement rallié (2004) (7) et les récentes décisions du Conseil du Fiqh d’Amérique du Nord (2006) (8) s’inscrivent dans cette ligne de pensée.

L’astronome et le calendrier

Le calendrier lunaire basé sur le calcul astronomique était déjà un outil hautement performant du temps des Babyloniens (18è s. av. J.C.). Il répond parfaitement, de nos jours encore, aux divers besoins d’une société moderne.

Le mois lunaire débute au moment de la « conjonction » mensuelle, quand la Lune se trouve située sur une ligne droite entre la Terre et le Soleil. Le mois est défini comme la durée moyenne d’une rotation de la Lune autour de la Terre (29,53 j environ).La lunaison varie au sein d’une plage dont les limites sont de 29. 27 j au solstice d’été et de 29.84 j au solstice d’hiver, donnant, pour l’année de 12 mois, une durée moyenne de 354,37 j. L’astronome babylonien Kidinnu (4è s. av. J.C.?), très connu pour ses travaux astronomiques, a calculé la durée du mois synodique comme égale à 29j, 12h 44 mn 3,3 s, alors que la valeur admise aujourd’hui est de 29j, 12h 44mn 2,8 s, soit environ une demi seconde d’écart.

Les astronomes ont posé, depuis des millénaires, la convention que des mois de 30 j et de 29 j se succédaient en alternance, ce qui permettait de faire correspondre la durée de rotation de la Lune sur deux mois consécutifs à un nombre de jours entiers (59), laissant à peine un petit écart mensuel de 44 mn environ, qui se cumulait pour atteindre 24 h (soit l’équivalent d’un jour) en 2,73 ans. Pour solder cet écart, il suffisait d’ajouter un jour au dernier mois de l’année, tous les trois ans environ, de la même manière qu’on ajoute un jour tous les quatre ans au calendrier grégorien. Les années dites « abondantes » du calendrier islamique, d’une durée de 355 j chacune, sont au nombre de 11 dans un cycle de 30 ans (années n° 2, 5, 7, 10, 13, 16, 18, 21, 24, 26 et 29), alors que les années dites « communes », d’une durée de 354 j, sont au nombre de 19.

Dans l’Arabie pré-islamique, les bédouins utilisaient un calendrier lunaire basé sur une année de 12 mois. Mais ils avaient pris l’habitude, depuis l’an 412, de leur adjoindre un 13è mois mobile, (dont le concept avait été emprunté au calendrier israélite), dans le but de faire correspondre le mois du hajj à la saison d’automne. Ces ajustements ayant fait l’objet de grands abus, le Coran les a réprimés en fixant à douze le nombre de mois d’une année et en interdisant l’intercalation du 13è mois. (9) Mais il ne fournit aucune autre indication d’ordre méthodologique concernant la confection du calendrier lunaire, et ne fait aucune référence au calcul astronomique.

Les bédouins étaient habitués à observer la position des étoiles, de nuit, pour se guider dans leurs déplacements à travers le désert, et à observer l’apparition de la nouvelle lune pour connaître le début des mois. Quand ils interrogèrent le Prophète sur la procédure à suivre pour déterminer le début et la fin du mois de jeûne, il leur recommanda de commencer le jeûne du mois du ramadan avec l’observation de la naissance de la nouvelle lune [au soir du 29è j du mois] et d’arrêter le jeûne avec la naissance de la nouvelle lune (du mois de shawal). « Si le croissant n’est pas visible (à cause des nuages) comptez jusqu’à 30 j. ». (10)

La recommandation confortait dans ses habitudes ancestrales une communauté qui ne savait ni écrire ni compter et qui n’avait pas d’accès, de toutes façons, à d’autres méthodes de suivi des mois. Les données astronomiques n’étaient pas communément disponibles pour être utilisées par la population de manière pratique, en tous lieux, comme c’est le cas aujourd’hui pour les agendas et calendriers, par exemple.

Les ulémas et les autorités temporelles en ont déduit, à tort ou à raison, que chacun des Etats islamiques devait (ou pouvait) procéder pour son propre compte à l’observation mensuelle de la nouvelle lune dans le ciel (ou à défaut attendre l’achèvement d’un 30è j) avant de décréter le début d’un nouveau mois sur son territoire, au lieu de faire démarrer le mois avec la conjonction mensuelle.

Or, le croissant lunaire ne devient généralement visible que quelques 18 h après la conjonction, et sujet à l’existence de conditions favorables résultant de facteurs tels que le nombre d’heures écoulées depuis la conjonction ; les positions relatives du Soleil, du croissant lunaire et de l’observateur ; l’altitude de la lune au coucher du soleil ; le lieu où l’on procède à l’observation ; l’angle formé avec le soleil au moment du coucher ; les conditions d’observation (pollution, humidité, température de l’air, altitude) ; la limite de détection de l’oeil humain ; etc. (11)

Selon les mois et les saisons, les conditions favorables d’observation de la nouvelle lune seront réunies en des sites différents du globe terrestre. Des astronomes musulmans de renom, des temps médiévaux, tels que Ibn Tariq (8è s.), Al-Khawarizmi (780 ?-863), Al-Battani (850-929), Al-Bayrouni (973-1048), Tabari (11è s.), Ibn Yunus (11è s.), Nassir al-Din Al-Tousi (1258-1274 ?), etc. ont contribué de manière importante, pendant plusieurs siècles, au développement des connaissances théoriques et appliquées dans le domaine de l’astronomie. Ils ont accordé un intérêt particulier à l’étude des critères de visibilité de la nouvelle lune, dans le but de développer des techniques de prédiction fiables du début d’un nouveau mois.

Mais, ce n’est que récemment que des astronomes et des informaticiens réputés ont réussi, en conjuguant leurs efforts, à établir des procédures permettant de prédire à l’avance, chaque mois, dans quelles régions du globe les conditions optimales seront réunies pour observer la nouvelle lune. Ainsi, en 1984, un physicien de Malaisie, Mohamed Ilyas, a pu tracer au niveau du globe terrestre une ligne de démarcation, ou ligne de date lunaire, à l’ouest de laquelle le croissant est visible le soir du nouveau mois, alors qu’il ne peut être vu à l’est de cette ligne que le soir suivant. (11)

Cependant, malgré leur intérêt considérable sur le plan théorique, ces travaux ne sont encore d’aucune aide sur le plan pratique, parce qu’ils continuent d’associer le début du mois nouveau à l’observation mensuelle de la nouvelle lune, une démarche qui ne permet pas d’établir des calendriers annuels à l’avance. Des voies de progrès plus concrètes ont été proposées par les penseurs islamiques modernes, qui ont étudié les aspects théologiques de la problématique du calendrier.

Par Khalid Chraibi

mardi 11 mars 2008

Des dispositions nationales différentes en fonction des interprétations

La question des droits de la femme dans les pays musulmans est entourée de paradoxes. L’islam fut un précurseur en matière de libération de la femme, redéfinissant dès le 7è siècle son statut au sein de la société, et lui donnant sa pleine quote-part de droits et de responsabilités. Elle acquit le droit de recevoir un héritage, de gérer librement ses biens et d’accéder au domaine du savoir, entre autres innovations dans sa situation. La charia redéfinit et rééquilibra les rôles respectifs des époux, au sein de la famille, afin que chacun d’eux puisse assumer pleinement les responsabilités qui lui étaient attribuées, et contribuer de manière efficace à l’épanouissement de la cellule familiale et à la consolidation des assises de la communauté.

Les autorités politiques et religieuses des pays musulmans insistent, à cet égard, dans les documents qu’elles soumettent à des organismes internationaux spécialisés, tels que le « Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination à l’égard des femmes » de l’ONU (CEDAW), sur le fait que « le Coran et la Sunna contiennent des règles qui ne souffrent d’aucune ambiguïté en faveur de la non-discrimination entre les hommes et les femmes, visant à s’assurer que les femmes jouissent des mêmes droits et responsabilités (que les hommes), sur une base d’égalité. » Elles ajoutent que « si une femme est victime de discrimination ou d’une injustice, les lois du pays exigent qu’on la rétablisse dans ses droits. »

Néanmoins, en ce début du 21è siècle, les associations féminines opérant dans le domaine des droits des femmes, ainsi que les différents organismes internationaux spécialisés en la matière, estiment que le statut de beaucoup de femmes reste peu enviable, dans de nombreux pays musulmans. Les femmes dont ces associations s’occupent vivent dans des foyers caractérisés par l’oppression, l’exploitation, le mauvais traitement, la menace constante de répudiation, la polygamie, la violence domestique, les « crimes d’honneur », le mariage « misyar », etc. Elles sont, de même, victimes de pratiques discriminatoires sur le lieu de travail, que ce soit au niveau de l’emploi, du statut, du niveau de rémunération et de responsabilités exercées, des promotions, etc., sans parler des cas de harcèlement sexuel.

Ainsi, à l’occasion de la soumission par l’Arabie Saoudite à la CEDAW, en 2007, de son premier rapport sur la condition de la femme en Arabie Saoudite, un groupe de femmes s’identifiant comme “Women for Reform” (Femmes pour la Réforme) fit parvenir anonymement à la CEDAW un “shadow-report” (contre-rapport) de 75 pages détaillant toutes les difficultés auxquelles les femmes saoudiennes étaient confrontées, de manière routinière, dans tous les aspects de leur vie quotidienne.

Ce rapport dénonce la ségrégation totale qui existe entre les sexes, et toutes les conséquences négatives qui s’ensuivent pour les femmes, dans tous les aspects de leur vie. « Women for reform » expliquent, avec force détails, que les femmes saoudiennes vivent littéralement « sous tutelle » d’un mâle et, « sans la permission de son « tuteur », une femme ne peut ni étudier, ni accéder aux soins médicaux, ni se marier, ni voyager à l’étranger, ni gérer des affaires, ni faire pratiquement quoi que ce soit de significatif… »

En réponse à ces observations, les autorités politiques et religieuses d’Arabie Saoudite répliquent qu’elles ne font preuve d’aucune discrimination dans leur manière de traiter les femmes. Elles se contentent d’appliquer les règles de la charia. Elles expliquent qu’en appliquant à chacun des deux sexes les règles de la charia qui le concernent, les autorités politiques ne bafouent les droits d’aucun individu, qu’il soit mâle ou femelle. Elles font, tout simplement, preuve d’une conception des droits humains qui est différente de celle des pays occidentaux.

Mais, est-ce vraiment le cas ? On peut se poser honnêtement la question, sur la base des deux exemples suivants. Ils illustrent ce que beaucoup de personnes peuvent considérer comme des abus dont les autorités font preuve, dans certains pays musulmans et dans certaines situations, quand elles confondent ce qui relève, à proprement parler, des coutumes et traditions du pays et ce qui peut être attribué, à juste titre, à la charia.

Par exemple, la charia interdit-elle à la femme de conduire un véhicule, comme l’ont affirmé pendant les deux dernières décennies les autorités politiques saoudiennes, sur la base d’une fatwa du Grand Mufti du pays ? La situation était étonnante, dans la mesure où aucun autre pays musulman n’interdit à la femme de conduire un véhicule. Le raisonnement du Grand Mufti, pour justifier l’interdiction, est également inattendu : en sortant seule dans son véhicule, la femme serait confrontée à toutes sortes de tentations peu recommandables, auxquelles elle risquerait de succomber.

Aujourd’hui, les dirigeants du pays affirment, au plus haut niveau, qu’il s’agit d’une simple « question de société » sans rapport avec la religion, et qui doit être réglée par consensus, dans le cadre de discussions au sein des familles et des groupes sociaux. Mais, à ce jour, et malgré les déclarations de certaines personnalités, les femmes ne sont toujours pas autorisées à obtenir un permis de conduire, parce que des groupes saoudiens puissants s’opposent à toute modification du statu quo.

La question de la « khulwa », dans certains pays du Moyen Orient, pourrait également relever de ce genre de cas. Les médias internationaux ont rapporté, en février 2008, l’histoire de Yara, une saoudienne de 40 ans, mariée et mère de 3 enfants, cadre supérieur d’une grande société financière, qui fut arrêtée par des membres de la « Commission pour la promotion de la vertu et la prévention du vice », alors qu’elle prenait un café avec un collègue, en public, dans un établissement réputé de la chaîne Starbucks, à Riyad, en attendant le début d’une conférence professionnelle organisée par ses employeurs.

Elle fut détenue pendant plusieurs heures dans une isolation totale, à la prison de Riyad. Son téléphone lui fut confisqué, et elle dut « confesser » par écrit, sous la contrainte, avoir commis la faute de « khulwa », parce qu’elle s’était assise à la même table qu’un homme, sans la présence d’un « mehrem », (c’est-à-dire un proche parent qu’elle ne pouvait pas épouser, chargé de surveiller sa conduite). Un interlocuteur invisible lui répéta comme une litanie, pendant tout son temps de détention, qu’elle était une femme de mauvaise vie.

La faute de « khulwa » est habituellement sanctionnée, dans les pays du Golfe, de 80 à 160 coups de fouet et de 3 à 6 mois de prison ferme. Yara ne put ressortir de prison, et échapper à une telle sanction, que grâce aux interventions de son mari en haut lieu.

Mais, existe-t-il vraiment en droit musulman une faute de « khulwa » sanctionnée par la charia, comme l’affirme le Ministère de la Justice saoudien ? Ou bien s’agit-il de simples coutumes et traditions locales, confondues à tort avec la religion, comme l’affirment les associations de défense des droits des femmes, qui observent qu’il n’existe aucune mention de la « khulwa » dans le Coran, et que de nombreux pays musulmans (comme ceux d’Afrique du Nord) ne font aucune référence à une « infraction » de « khulwa » dans leur application de la charia ?

Les juristes musulmans ne s’étonnent guère de l’existence de pratiques différentes, dans l’application de la charia, d’un pays musulman à l’autre. L’existence officielle de 4 rites différents dans l’islam sunnite (Abu Hanifa, Chafii, Malik, Ibn Hanbal), et d’un rite shiite principal les a habitués à la confrontation, sur de nombreux points de droit, de raisonnements juridiques complexes, aboutissant à des conclusions différentes selon les rites. Ils savent également que, dans chaque pays qui a codifié le droit civil sous forme d’une « moudawwana » nationale, les autorités politiques et religieuses du pays interprètent différentes dispositions de la charia selon leur propre conception des choses, même au sein du même rite.

La comparaison des « moudawwanas » adoptées en Egypte en 2000 et au Maroc en 2004 témoigne, ainsi, des divergences importantes dont les juristes musulmans peuvent faire preuve dans l’interprétation de la charia, même s’agissant de pays musulmans à culture relativement comparable.

Les juristes s’enorgueillissent de cette flexibilité du droit musulman, qu’ils considèrent comme une bénédiction du ciel, et une preuve de sa vitalité et de sa capacité à s’adapter aux besoins de tous les musulmans, en tous temps et en tous lieux.

Les associations féminines musulmanes devraient également se réjouir de cette flexibilité, grâce à laquelle elles peuvent espérer accomplir des progrès considérables dans la protection des droits des femmes dans les pays musulmans, dans le respect aussi bien de la lettre que de l’esprit de la charia.

Par Khalid Chraibi

mardi 8 janvier 2008

Quand on est à la fois Français et musulman, les questions suivantes peuvent parfois se poser avec acuité : Est-ce la citoyenneté française qui doit primer, avec les lois qui lui sont associées, ou bien est-ce que ce sont les convictions religieuses de l’individu, et les prescriptions juridiques qui les accompagnent ?

Ainsi, lors du débat sur la laïcité, il y a quelques années, certains membres de la communauté musulmane ont-ils adopté des positions extrêmes sur la question du foulard, alors que certaines jeunes filles affirmaient fièrement, avec le soutien de leurs parents, qu’elles préfèreraient abandonner l’école, tout simplement, plutôt que d’y retourner sans foulard.

Mais, les bienfaits de l’éducation sont tellement incommensurables, par rapport au fait de porter un foulard, que la question ne devrait même pas se poser à un esprit raisonnable. Le Prophète n’a-t-il pas préconisé de « rechercher la connaissance jusqu’en Chine, si nécessaire » ? Alors, s’il faut sacrifier un foulard pour obtenir une éducation dont on recueillera, soi-même et toute sa communauté, les bénéfices toute sa vie, le prix est-il si élevé ?

La question s’est également posée au niveau des structures médicales : « S’il n’y a pas de chirurgien femme pour pratiquer une opération sur une femme, faut-il laisser un homme pratiquer l’opération, ou faut-il laisser la femme mourir tout simplement ? » Seuls, des hommes accordant bien peu de valeur à la vie humaine en général, et à celle de leur femme en particulier, la laisseraient mourir dans de telles conditions, plutôt que de la laisser se faire opérer par un homme.

La loi française ne laisse aucune latitude de ce genre à l’homme. La vraie question à se poser est la suivante : « Qui a donné à l’homme musulman un tel droit de vie ou de mort sur sa femme ? » Certainement pas l’islam, ni le droit musulman. Pourtant, de telles situations sont observées tous les jours dans de nombreux pays.

De tels comportements se rattachent le plus souvent à l’extrémisme religieux, plutôt qu’à une vraie connaissance de l’islam et de ses enseignements. Autrement, comment s’expliquer que les gardes d’une école primaire d’Arabie Saoudite aient enfermé une vingtaine de fillettes dans une école en flammes, il y a quelques années, les laissant délibérément mourir, brûlées vives, ou asphyxiées par la fumée, sous prétexte que les petites filles ne portaient pas leur foulard sur la tête, au moment où l’incendie s’est déclaré, et ne pouvaient donc pas sortir tête nue dans la rue, pour sauver leur vie ?

De nos jours, de tels comportements sont d’autant plus incompréhensibles que l’islam prône l’établissement de la « communauté du milieu » (al oummat-al-wassat), celle qui se situe par définition loin de tout extrême, ou à équidistance des positions extrêmes. « Al oummat-al-wassat » est également la communauté des justes.

Pour sa part, le Prophète a recommandé, aux musulmans d’éviter tout extrémisme dans la pratique de la religion (al-ghoulouwwou fiddine), rappelant que ce sont les prises de position extrémistes qui ont provoqué la ruine des anciennes communautés humaines.

A un deuxième niveau, encore plus complexe, se posent au Français musulman des questions de droit telles que les suivantes :

Faut-il contester les lois interdisant la polygamie ou la répudiation ? Faut-il revendiquer un régime spécial les autorisant pour les minorités musulmanes ?

Faut-il se soumettre à la loi interdisant aux parents de marier leur fille, contre son gré, à un homme choisi par eux, ou la contester ?

Faut-il se soumettre à la loi mettant à égalité les parts d’héritage, sans distinction de sexe, ou la contester ?

Mais, la polygamie, la répudiation, ou le mariage d’une fille, contre son gré, à un homme choisi par ses parents, ne sont que des indications de l’usage sélectif, et inique pour les femmes, que beaucoup de musulmans font des enseignements de la charia. Ils le font souvent de bonne foi, dans la mesure où la majorité des musulmans confondent aisément, aujourd’hui, traditions et prescriptions religieuses.

Mais, une lecture attentive de la charia démontre l’existence de règles très strictes qui s’appliquent à de telles situations, et qui en font l’exception et non la règle. Les hommes, cependant, s’empressent d’oublier les règles qui les incommodent pour ne retenir que celles qui les avantagent.

Quant à la question de l’égalité des parts d’héritage, sans discrimination sur la base du sexe, elle se pose dans le monde moderne de manière bien différente de la manière dont elle se posait aux femmes de la communauté musulmane au 7è s. A l’époque, les femmes de bonne famille vivaient au foyer, s’occupaient de leur ménage et d’élever leurs enfants. Elles disposaient d’esclaves pour les aider dans leurs tâches. L’homme subvenait à tous les besoins de la famille.

Afin d’empêcher que les terres, les animaux et autres biens de la tribu ne passent sous le contrôle d’autres tribus, à travers les mécanismes des mariages et de l’héritage, la tribu musulmane n’accordait à la femme que la moitié de la part d’héritage d’un homme. Il faut se souvenir, cependant, que l’islam a innové de manière considérable, à l’époque de la Révélation, en introduisant cette part d’héritage destinée à la femme, alors qu’elle n’en recevait aucune dans les communautés d’Arabie, avant l’islam.

Mais, aujourd’hui, combien de foyers doivent survivre sans homme, surtout lorsque le mari peut répudier sa femme sur un coup de tête, lui laissant la charge de toutes les dépenses en plus des enfants à élever ? Même dans les ménages unis, combien de femmes sont obligées de travailler pour que le ménage dispose de revenus adéquats pour couvrir les besoins courants de la famille, et pour s’acheter une voiture ou une maison, ou prendre des vacances ?

Lorsque le ménage a des enfants à élever, et qu’ils doivent faire des études supérieures à un coût élevé, la femme n’a-t-elle pas besoin d’argent, autant que son mari, pour aider à couvrir de telles dépenses ?

Dans les pays musulmans, les voies de progrès en matière juridique existent, et sont faciles à repérer, dans la mesure où les codes de la famille appliqués présentent des différences importantes sur des points significatifs. Par exemple, les dispositions de la « moudawana » (code de la famille) adoptée au Maroc en 2004 diffèrent grandement des dispositions appliquées en Egypte depuis l’an 2000 ou à celles en vigueur en Arabie Saoudite.

Le contraste est encore plus frappant lorsqu’on compare les dispositions de droit musulman appliquées sur ces questions dans des pays non-arabes tels que l’Indonésie, la Malaisie, l’Inde, le Pakistan, le Sénégal, le Nigéria ou l’Afrique du Sud.

Le droit musulman témoigne ainsi d’une grande richesse et souplesse pour faire face à toutes les situations auxquelles la communauté musulmane peut se trouver confrontée. Mais, les autorités politiques et religieuses des pays musulmans se refusent à les exploiter, parce qu’elles ont été habituées pendant 10 siècles d’immobilisme politique, économique, social et intellectuel à rejeter tout changement, toute innovation, toute « bid’a ».

Actuellement, les associations de droits humains et les associations de droits de la femme dans les pays musulmans se fixent des objectifs relativement modestes. Elles voudraient simplement obtenir des autorités que les conventions internationales sur le respect des droits de l’homme, de la femme et de l’enfant signées par les Etats musulmans y soient appliquées, confortant les dispositions énoncées par l’islam lui-même en la matière, et souvent peu respectées.

Mais, en France, les lois nationales ont réglé ces questions depuis de nombreuses années, de manière conforme aux droits humains, à l’esprit de justice, d’équité et de solidarité familiale, au point que beaucoup d’associations des pays musulmans les considèrent comme des modèles de ce qu’elles voudraient réaliser à long terme. N’est-il pas plus raisonnable pour le Français musulman, dans ces conditions, de construire son avenir sur la base de ces acquis, qui sont parfaitement conformes à l’esprit de l’islam, plutôt que de chercher à les remettre en cause ?

Par Khalid Chraibi
samedi 29 septembre 2007

Un courant religieux conservateur, prenant naissance dans les Etats du Golfe, se propage depuis plusieurs années dans les autres pays musulmans, s’étendant à de nombreux aspects de la vie quotidienne. Par exemple, sous l’influence des prédicateurs du Moyen Orient, des Marocains se demandent, aujourd’hui, (comme beaucoup de musulmans résidant en Europe et en Amérique du Nord), si les opérations de banque moderne sont conformes à la charia, alors que d’autres citoyens n’hésitent pas à affirmer que seules les opérations des « banques islamiques » sont « halal ».

Cette influence des Etats du Golfe sur la culture des musulmans résidant dans d’autres pays, ressort clairement de la question posée, au cours de l’été 2006, au prédicateur qatari Yusuf al-Qaradawi, alors en visite au Maroc : un Marocain peut-il licitement contracter un prêt à intérêt auprès d’une banque marocaine, pour financer l’achat d’un logement, puisqu’il n’existe pas au Maroc de banques offrant des « produits islamiques » ?

Le prédicateur s’est référé à une décision du Conseil Européen de la Fatwa, qui autorise les minorités islamiques vivant en Europe, sans accès à des banques opérant selon les règles de la charia, à prendre de tels prêts, en se basant sur la règle : « La nécessité abolit les interdits » (addarouratou toubihou al mahdhourat). D’après lui, cette règle s’applique parfaitement au cas marocain.

L’influence des prédicateurs du Moyen Orient sur les Marocains, en matière de choix bancaires, s’amplifiera, sans doute, au cours des prochaines années, du fait que Bank al Maghrib a maintenant autorisé le système bancaire national à commercialiser des « produits islamiques » sélectionnés, dans le cadre de « fenêtres » spécialisées. Le revirement des autorités marocaines, qui se sont opposées au cours des deux dernières décennies à ce genre d’opérations, s’explique, entre autres, par l’engagement des opérateurs des pays du Golfe à investir plusieurs milliards de dollars dans l’économie marocaine, à la seule condition qu’on leur fournisse les « conduits » adéquats.

Au cœur du débat sur les institutions bancaires des deux types, on trouve le concept d’intérêt. La banque moderne l’applique dans ses opérations, alors que la banque « islamique » en nie l’utilisation. Or, dans l’esprit de nombreux musulmans, le concept d’intérêt est inextricablement lié à celui de « riba », que le Coran interdit de manière explicite et sans équivoque.

Le riba recouvre en premier lieu l’usure, sur l’interdiction de laquelle il y a unanimité. Mais, d’après une majorité des oulémas, il englobe aussi « l’intérêt sous toutes ses formes ». Mais, de nombreux experts estiment, depuis le milieu du 19è s., que l’extension de la notion de riba aux intérêts bancaires, sur la base du « qiyas » et de l’ijtihad, s’est faite sur des bases juridiques discutables, dans la mesure où les opérations de banque moderne sont de nature totalement différente de ce qui existait en Arabie, au temps de la Révélation.

En effet, ce n’est qu’aux 19è et 20è s., suite à l’occupation de différents pays musulmans par des Etats européens, que les structures bancaires modernes, utilisant des instruments financiers incorporant le concept d’intérêt, ont fait leur apparition dans ces pays. Les oulémas ont assez rapidement compris le fonctionnement du système, et réalisé que l’intérêt constituait une rémunération justifiée du capital financier et de l’épargne.

C’est ce qui explique que, depuis un siècle et demi, les Grands Muftis d’Egypte et Sheikhs d’Al-Azhar, ayant assimilé cette conclusion, déploient des efforts théoriques considérables pour établir la différence entre les intérêts bancaires (aux retombées économiques positives et donc souhaitables) et le riba prohibé.

Ce n’est guère le lieu de citer, ici, toutes les fatwas significatives énoncées sur ces questions, en Egypte, pendant le dernier siècle. Muhammad Abduh, Mahmud Shaltut, Muhammad Sayyed Tantawi ou Nasr Farid Wasil (tous Grands Muftis d’Egypte et Sheikhs d’Al-Azhar), sont les auteurs de textes importants, pour ne citer que certains des noms connus sur le plan international. Tous ces éminents experts de la charia considèrent que l’assimilation du riba à l’intérêt bancaire est discutable, et constitue une interprétation abusive des règles du droit musulman.

Abd al Mun’im Al Nimr, ancien ministre des Habous d’Egypte, fournit une bonne illustration de ces propos : « L’interdiction du riba se justifie par le tort porté au débiteur. Mais, puisqu’il n’y a aucun tort porté aux personnes qui procèdent à des dépôts dans une banque, l’interdiction du riba ne s’applique pas aux dépôts en banque. » Des raisonnements similaires s’appliquent aux divers autres aspects des opérations bancaires.

Quand on limite le domaine du riba à celui de l’usure, comme le font ces juristes islamiques éminents, la banque moderne n’est plus concernée par le riba, puisqu’elle ne se livre pas à l’usure. Et c’est exactement cela le raisonnement marocain en la matière, par exemple.

Quant à la proposition selon laquelle les activités des banques islamiques n’incorporent pas d’intérêt, elle soulève un débat de fond. D’après certains, ces banques se contenteraient, dans certains cas, de procéder à des manipulations sémantiques, substituant un mot à un autre (« loyer » au lieu d’ « intérêt », par exemple) ou introduisant des étapes multiples dans une procédure (rédaction de deux contrats au lieu d’un seul), pour atteindre leurs buts lucratifs, tout en respectant, en apparence, les stipulations de la charia. Cela ferait partie des « hiyals » (ruses juridiques) dans lesquelles les théologiens musulmans sont passés maîtres, au cours des siècles.

Ainsi, par exemple, un musulman habitant aux Etats-Unis, et cherchant à acheter un logement en utilisant un crédit bancaire, s’est adressé simultanément à une banque américaine conventionnelle et à une banque islamique opérant aux Etats-Unis pour obtenir leur devis au sujet du coût global de l’opération. A sa grande surprise, le devis de la banque islamique était plus élevé que celui de la banque conventionnelle américaine. Il s’est adressé à un site islamique d’internet, pour essayer d’obtenir une explication. Un théologien renommé lui a répondu qu’il y avait encore peu de banques islamiques opérant aux Etats-Unis, d’où les devis élevés de ces dernières.

Mais, continuait-il, la situation ne manquera pas de s’améliorer, à l’avenir, quand il y aura suffisamment de banques islamiques en activité sur le territoire américain, pour les obliger à baisser le prix de leurs prestations du fait de la concurrence.

La question que le théologien n’a pas abordée dans sa réponse, et qui est pourtant importante, est la suivante : « Si le devis de la banque islamique qui n’applique pas d’intérêt est supérieur à celui de la banque conventionnelle qui en applique un, quel est l’avantage pour le consommateur qu’une banque n’applique pas le taux d’intérêt assimilé au riba, si elle lui fait payer des commissions et des frais d’un montant supérieur à celui qu’impliquent le taux d’intérêt et les frais des banques conventionnelles ? »

Car, il faut bien le constater, le prêt sans intérêt de la banque islamique lui revient plus cher (ou dans le meilleur des cas aussi cher) que le prêt avec intérêt de la banque conventionnelle. Ce n’est certainement pas l’objectif recherché par l’islam, quand il dénonce la pratique du riba.

Wednesday, August 02, 2006

Khalid Chraibi

“(Lawful unto you in marriage) are (not only) chaste women who are Believers, but chaste women among the People of the Book, revealed before your time, when ye give them their due dowers, and desire chastity, not lewdness, nor secret intrigues.” (Quran V,5)

Summary of major findings :

Contrary to widely-held beliefs, misyar marriage fits within the general regime of marriage in Muslim law, and not in a special regime. Its fulfillment of all the requirements of the sharia is a sine qua none condition for its validity.

Muslim law confers on the parties the right to set up in the marriage contract certain particular stipulations relative to their reciprocal rights and obligations. When the parties agree, within the framework of the marriage “misyar”, that the woman will give up some of the rights the law confers to her as a wife, this is perfectly legal, if that is her will freely expressed.

But, in the event of a change of circumstances, she can assert all the rights which the law confers to her in her capacity as a wife (like the “nafaqa” for example), because these are inalienable rights within the framework of the marriage.

The clause of renunciation constitutes only a promise not to assert certain rights. It has an undeniable standing as a moral commitment, but is of no value on the legal level. The wife can thus respect it as long as she wishes, and reclaim all her legal rights when she needs to do so.

Such a clause does not affect in any way the rights of the children who could be born from this union, such as the recognition of paternity, the effects of filiation, the financial responsibility of the father for his children, or the lawful rights of the wife and children to their share of inheritance, etc.

Despite the fact that the “misyar” marriage is perfectly legal, according to the theologians, and that the wife can reclaim at any time the rights which she gave up at the time of establishment of the marriage contract, many theologians like Muhammad Ibn Othaymin or Nassirouddine Al-Albany, as well as many Al Azhar professors, are opposed to this type of marriage because it contradicts the spirit of the islamic law of marriage and has perverse effects on the woman, the family and the community in general.

Definition of a Misyar Marriage

“Nikah Misyar” or “travellers’ marriage” (Arabic language|Arabic]]: {{Ar|نكاح المسيار}}) can be described as a legal framework of [[marriage]] in which a [[Islam|Muslim]] couple is united by the bonds of marriage, based on the usual Islamic marriage contract, but without the husband having to take the usual financial commitments with respect to his wife. The latter exempts him from some of them by a clause of the marriage contract through which she gives up some of her rights (such as cohabitation with the husband, the equal division of the nights between all the wives in the event of [[polygamy]], the residence, the subsidy of maintenance “nafaqa”, etc…). (1)

The wife continues to carry out a separate life from that of her husband, living in her home and providing for her needs by her own means. But her husband has the right to go to her home (or to the residence of her parents, where she is often supposed to reside), at any hour of the day or the night, whenever he wants to. The couple can then appease in a licit way their “legitimate sexual needs” (to which the wife cannot refuse herself).

The marriage misyar represents, according to some, a spontaneous adaptation of the mode of marriage to the concrete needs of people who are not able any more to marry in the traditional way in countries such as [[Saudi Arabia]], [[Kuwait]] or the [[United Arab Emirates]], because of the dearness of the rents ; the high cost-of-life in general; the high amounts of [[dowry]] required; and other similar economic and financial reasons. (2)

It fits the needs of a conservative society which punishes severely “[[zina]]” ([[fornication]]) and other sexual relationships which are established outside the bonds of marriage. The [[Theology|theologians]] explain that it is suitable for young people whose resources are too limited to found a home ; for the all too-numerous widows living in the area, who have their own residence and their own financial resources, and who cannot hope to marry again according to the usual formula (or do not wish to), because they have dependent children, for example ; for the numerous divorcees ; as well as for the “old maids” who see their youth fading in an involuntary celibacy, without having tasted the joys of marriage, for one reason or another. Thus, a million and half women are reduced to a situation of forced celibacy in Saudi Arabia alone. (3)

The Sheikh of [[Al-Azhar]] [[Muhammad Sayid Tantawi]] and the well-known theologian [[Yusuf Al-Qaradawi]] note, however, in their writings and in their lectures, that a major proportion of the men who take a spouse in the framework of the marriage “misyar” are already married men. (4)

Some traits of this marriage are reminiscent of the Nikah [[Mut'ah]] which was practised in Arabia before Islam, and is still practised by [[Shia]] Muslims as a legitimate form of marriage, although it is considered as an illicit one by [[Sunni]] Muslims. (5)

But, whereas the Nikah Mut’ah is based on a contract with a fixed date of expiration, the Misyar marriage contract is concluded for an indeterminate period (even though the husband who enters into this union looks at it only as a temporary marriage, which ends up in divorce in 80 % of the cases).

The popularity of misyar marriage today results, probably, from a misunderstanding about its real nature, and about its true legal implications for the husband, the wife and the children that may be born from this marriage.

Licitness of misyar marriage

From a legal standpoint, the marriage “misyar” raises several complex issues : is it licit ? Doesn’t it violate the wife’s legitimate rights ? What is the legal value of the wife’s renunciation to some of her rights ? What effets does this situation have on the family and at the social level ?

Contrary to widely-held beliefs, misyar marriage fits within the general regime of marriage in Muslim law, and not in a special regime. Its fulfillment of all the requirements of the sharia is a sine qua none condition for its validity.

Thus, when Muslim theologians say that the “misyar” marriage is perfectly licit, all they mean is that the contract on which it is based must fulfill all the requirements set out by the charia (agreement of both parties ; presence of a tutor in certain rites ; payment by the husband to his wife (or to the “tutor”) of a dowry of an amount agreed upon between them (which can be important or modest, according to their wishes) ; presence of witnesses ; publicity of the marriage…). (6)

The Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA), a specialized body of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), has conforted this point of view in a fatwa (7) of April 12, 2006. (8) and (9)

The clause by which the woman gives up some of her rights (the cohabitation of the couple, the residence, the subsidy towards maintenance (nafaqa)…) raises, for its part, more subtle points of law. Does it belong with this category of well-known clauses in Muslim law which are against the essence of the marriage contract, and which vitiate the latter and make it null, as well as the legal union which is based upon it? Or, maybe, with this second category of clauses which are struck of nullity, whereas the marriage contract remains valid?

The Sheikh of Al-Azhar Muhammad Sayyed Tantawi reminds one, in this respect, that Muslim law confers on the parties the right to set up in the marriage contract certain particular stipulations relative to their reciprocal rights and obligations. When the parties agree, within the framework of the marriage “misyar”, that the woman will give up some of the rights the law confers to her as a wife, this is perfectly legal, if that is her will freely expressed. (10)

The former mufti of Egypt Nasr Fareed Wassel adds, for his part, that the woman can legitimately give up some of her rights at the time of marriage, if she so wishes, owing to the fact that she has private means, for example, or that her father intends to continue to provide for her needs. But, in the event of a change of circumstances, she can assert all the rights which the law confers to her in her capacity as a wife (like the “nafaqa” for example), because these are inalienable rights within the framework of the marriage. (11)

Wassell notes that the clause of renunciation constitutes only a promise not to assert certain rights. It has an undeniable standing as a moral commitment, but is of no value on the legal level. The wife can thus respect it as long as she wishes, and reclaim all her legal rights when she needs to do so.

He adds that such a clause does not affect in any way the rights of the children who could be born from this union, such as the recognition of paternity, the effects of filiation, the financial responsibility of the father for his children, or the lawful rights of the wife and children to their share of inheritance, etc. (12)

The eminent Saudi theologian Abdullah bin Sulaiman bin Menie, a member of the Higher Council of Ulemas of Saudi Arabia, corroborates this point of view. In his opinion, the wife can denounce at any time the renunciation she agreed to at the time of marriage, and require of her husband that he give her all her rights, including that he live with her and provide for her financial needs (”nafaqa”). The husband can then either give her satisfaction or grant her a divorce (a right that any husband can exercise at any time, anyway). (13)

Professor Yusuf Al-Qaradawi , for his part, observes that he doesn’t support this type of marriage, but has to recognize that it is licit (14). He then states straightforwardly his preference that the clause of renunciation be not included within the marriage contract, but be the subject of a simple verbal agreement between the parties (15). He underlines the fact that Muslims are held by their commitments, whether they are written or verbal.

He thus conforts the point of view of Wassel and bin Menie on this question. He adds that the inclusion of this clause in the act would not invalidate the latter, which rejoins the point of view of the other two lawyers when they say that the clause can be denounced by the woman, and be declared without legal value, without calling into question the validity of the marriage itself.

Khalid Chraibi

SaudiDebate.com

Monday, 02 April 2007

The status of Arab women underwent a drastic change in the 7th Century, with the advent of Islam. The new faith liberated them from a situation of tutelage and granted them their full share of rights and responsibilities within Muslim society. The part they played in family life and in the community increased markedly, as they acquired the right to inherit property, conduct business, and have access to knowledge.

But these rights, to this day, aren’t properly implemented in many communities, and the issue of women’s rights continues to be at the center of a controversy in many countries. Thus, associations handling the cases of women in difficult situations describe innumerable instances of oppression, exploitation or mistreatment, with many women living under the threat of repudiation, polygamy, domestic violence, “honour” killings, and the like. At work, women suffer from discriminatory practices with regard to employment status, pay scales, responsibilities, promotion, not to mention sexual harassment.

In recent years, women’s rights have further deteriorated in various areas of the world, as extremist groups have become increasingly influential in the political and legislative life of different African and Asian countries. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan illustrated this development, imposing strict segregation between the sexes, compelling women to wear a burqa covering them from head to toe, denying them the right to education and to adequate health care, and preventing them from work. It also instituted lashings and amputations as forms of corporal punishment.

But the experience of Afghanistan’s women under the Taliban was in no way unique, as Zainah Anwar wrote of Malaysia : “New shari’a criminal laws were passed [in the 1990s in Malaysia], designed to ensure that the Muslim lifestyle does not transgress Islamic teachings. New offences were created, and moral surveillance, strict enforcement and more severe punishment of Muslims were introduced. The Islamic Family Law, one of the most enlightened personal status laws in the Muslim world, was amended to make divorce and polygamy easier for men, and reduce men’s financial responsibilities towards women.”

Women reading the Shari’ah :

Until these developments, women’s associations throughout the Muslim world had given high priority to putting pressure on Governments to implement the UN-sponsored international conventions these countries had signed, concerning human rights in general, and women’s rights in particular. They also wanted them to withdraw the reservations they had expressed on signing these conventions concerning various provisions – on the grounds that they “conflict with religion” – since the reservations had the effect of diluting much of the conventions’ usefulness.

The changed conditions in the Muslim world led these associations to redefine their priorities and to include a serious study of the Shari’ah, in order to determine for themselves what it really said, with the objective of developing new tools to oppose the repressive new laws, policies and amendments to existing laws that were being introduced by Islamic groups.

Says Nora Murat, from Malaysia’s Sisters in Islam organisation: “If, as believers, we want to live a life according to the tenets of our faith, a simplistic call to return to an idealised golden age of Islam, that has little bearing on the realities of today’s world, cannot be the answer. And yet the answers can be found within our faith – if only we have the intellectual vigour, the moral courage, and the political will to strive for a more enlightened and progressive interpretation of the Qur’an in our search for answers. For us in Sisters in Islam, this is not heretical; rather it is imperative, if religion is to be relevant to our lives today.”

Women’s associations were further motivated in their study of the Qu’ran and Sunnah by the realization, in the words of Pakistan’s Riffat Hassan, that “there was a big gap in what the Qu’ran was saying about women’s rights and what was actually happening in Muslim culture. So, one has to distinguish between Qu’ranic text and the Islamic tradition. The interpretation of the Qu’ran from the earliest times till now has been done almost entirely by men. It was also done in a male-dominated patriarchal culture. So the Qu’ran was interpreted through a male-centric cultural lens—which obviously has affected women’s rights.”

Women’s study of the Shari’ah convinced many of them, in the words of Nigeria’s Ayesha Imam, of the need “to distinguish between Islam – the way of Allah – on the one hand, and, what Muslims do – those who believe in Islam and attempt to practice it – on the other”. In a paper entitled “Women’s rights in Muslim laws”, she explains: “Islam is not questioned. But, what Muslims (human fallible people) make of Islam can be”.

She observes that, though religious laws draw their inspiration from the divine, they are not the same as divine laws. They “do rely on human agency to elaborate, implement and enforce them”. She explains that, in many situations, even the experts do not agree on the definitive meaning of verses in the Qu’ran. Moreover, it is admitted that “many hadith (accounts of the life of the Prophet) are apocryphal, motivated by inter-sect and dynastic rivalries”. Several hadiths of this type seem to have had as their principal aim to put restrictions on women’s rights, although they do not fit with surahs (chapters) in the Qu’ran or with other hadith.

Ms. Imam adds that many people believe the shari’ah to be the same everywhere, throughout the Muslim world. But the fact is that it varies significantly from one country to another, as well as over time. The existence of four main schools of Shari’ah in the Sunni tradition illustrates the diversity of interpretations. The founders of these schools themselves declared emphatically, and repeatedly, that their views should not be considered as final or binding on all Muslims. So, “refusing further ijtihad (personal reflection) is not a religious or divinely sanctioned act. It is not required in the Qu’ran or by the Sunnah. To the contrary, both the Qu’ran and hadith refer approvingly to thinking, reasoning and diversity of opinion”.

Though Ms. Imam’s analysis may come as a surprise to readers who have been raised in the belief of the singularity of Shari’ah in Muslim countries, the facts suggest otherwise, as is easily verified by a comparison of current Personal Muslim Law in various countries.

Personal Muslim Law also undergoes important changes over time within the same country, as illustrated, for example, by the evolution of family law in Egypt in the 20th Century. The reform of Morocco’s Family Law in 2004 illustrates, for its part, the considerable change in women’s rights that can be achieved over time, through a progressive, but faithful and equitable implementation of the provisions of the Shari’ah.

Change within the religious framework :

Morocco’s Moudawana (Personal Status Law) of 1957, though relatively modern and equitable in many respects, showed a clear conservative bias in its interpretation of many provisions of the Shari’ah, putting several undue restrictions on women’s rights. The network of Moroccan women associations fought for a half-century to obtain its reform.

In methodological terms, the revision was to be based on a very attentive reading of the Shari’ah, taking into account as faithfully, as fully and equitably as possible, all relevant surahs and hadiths applicable to every aspect of Muslim personal law. Nevertheless, a major controversy developed around the project, between modernist groups and conservative political forces, jeopardizing the whole operation, which was only saved through the personal intervention of King Mohamed VI.

Acting as Amir al-Moumineen (Commander of the Faithful), and assisted with the advice of the Council of Ulama, the King of Morocco had the final say on how to resolve difficulties of a religious nature, and he provided detailed explanations to Parliament on the choices he made. The Parliament had the final say on non-religious issues.

The reformed Family Law came into effect in 2004. Among other things, it makes the family the joint responsibility of both spouses, rescinding the wife’s duty of obedience to her husband. It allows women to be their own guardians, and raises the minimum age of marriage for women to eighteen years. It puts prohibitive restrictions on polygamy, by requiring the consent of the first wife, the notification of the second wife of the existence of the first one, and a judge’s consent to the second marriage – which may be granted if he is satisfied that the husband will grant equal status to each wife, in every respect. The Law makes polygamy grounds for divorce by the first wife, and promotes the use of a marriage contract to exclude the possibility of a second marriage by the husband. It puts repudiation under strict judicial control, and requires an equitable distribution of the couple’s assets before a divorce can be final.

The Moroccan Family Law of 2004 may have its shortcomings, but it is unquestionably rooted in the Shari’ah, in every respect. Nevertheless, thanks to a more modern interpretation of the stipulations of the Shari’ah, it affords a considerable progress in the situation of women in Morocco.

Who decides what is Islamic? :

Most womens’ associations working in the field of women’s rights understand fully, today, the usefulness of the strategy of change within the religious framework. Having drawn the lessons of past experiences, they are better prepared to confront the real issues. This shows clearly in the following observations by women working in the field.

Asks Zainah Anwar: “If Islam is to be used as a source of law and public policy to govern the public and private lives of citizens, then the question of who decides what is Islamic and what is not, is of paramount importance. What are the implications for democratic governance when only a small, exclusive group of people is accorded the right to interpret the Text and codify it? Particularly when they do so very often in a manner that isolates the Text from the socio-historical context in which it was revealed, isolates classical juristic opinion from the socio-historical context of the lives of the founding jurists of Islam, and isolates the Text from the context of contemporary society.”

Adds Nora Murat: “Knowledge that the Qur’an supports the universal values of equality, justice and a life of dignity for women, gives us the courage and conviction to stand up and argue with those who support discrimination against women in the name of religion. It is this knowledge that gives us the confidence to tell them that there are alternative views on the subject and that their obscurantist view, which discriminates against women, is not the only view in Islam.”

References :

Zainah Anwar: Islamisation and its impact on laws and law making process in Malaysia
Nora Murat: Sisters in Islam: Advocacy for change from within the religious framework
Riffat Hassan: Interview by Samina Ibrahim, Newsline, Karachi, April 2001
Ayesha Imam: Women’s rights in Muslim laws
Morocco: Family Law 2004

Khalid Chraibi

SaudiDebate.com

Tuesday, 24 April 2007

The question put to scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi at a youth gathering in Morocco, in the summer of 2006, was innocuous enough: in the absence of Islamic banking in Morocco, is it licit for a Moroccan to take an interest-bearing loan from a conventional bank to buy a home?

Al-Qaradawi referred his audience to a ruling by the European Council for Fatwa, which authorized Muslim minorities living in Europe, with no access to Islamic banking, to take such a loan, based on the rule that: “Necessity allows the use of what is illicit” (addarouratou toubihou al mahdhourat).

He added that, since the Moroccans had no possibility to buy a home except through the conventional banking system, their situation was comparable to that of Muslim minorities living in countries in which Islamic banking was not the norm. The ruling applicable to the latter was also applicable to them.

Al-Qaradawi’s fatwa raises the issue of the compliance of modern banking with the shari’ah, a subject of continuing controversy between traditionalist and modernist religious thinkers.

Between usury and interest

Modern banking is inextricably linked with interest, which many contemporary Muslims associate with riba. Since the Qur’an prohibits riba, explicitly and unequivocally, they are convinced that modern banking activities are “illicit”. But the definition of riba is elusive. For centuries, the ulema have been faced with the difficult challenge of sorting out, generation after generation, what the riba prohibition should apply to, and they have not reached any consensus on this matter to this day.

Of course, the ulema agree that riba refers, in the first place, to usury, i.e. “the lending of money with an exorbitant interest charge for its use”. But a majority of ulema consider that riba also refers, in a second meaning, to “interest under all its forms”. This was the position of al-Azhar’s Research Council when it ruled, in 1965: “Interest on all types of loans is forbidden Riba. There is no difference in this regard between so called consumption and production loans. Moreover, Riba is forbidden (haram) in small as well as large quantities, whether it is effected through time deposits, demand (or checking) deposits, or any interest-bearing loan contract. All such dealings are among the forbidden Riba”.

This was also the position upheld, more recently, by the Islamic Fiqh Academy (IFA), an affiliate of the Organization of Islamic Conference, which was established by its 43 member States to try to develop an Islamic consensus about just such complex fiqh issues. In a 1985 resolution, IFA stated: “Any increase or interest on a debt which has matured, in return for an extension of the maturity date, in case the borrower is unable to pay ; and the increase (or interest) on the loan at the inception of its agreement, are both forms of usury, which is prohibited under Shari’ah.”

Under this definition, conventional banking operations are all “illicit”, because they incorporate interest, i.e. “a charge for borrowed money, generally a percentage of the amount borrowed”. But, modern financial activities differ in kind from anything that existed at the time of Revelation. One may wonder, therefore, with Abdullah Yusuf Ali, about the legitimacy of extending to them the riba prohibition, based on “qiyas” and “ijtihad”.

Says Ali, best known for his classic translation of the Qur’an into English: “Our Ulema, ancient and modern, have worked out a great body of literature on Usury, based mainly on economic conditions as they existed at the rise of Islam. I agree with them on the main principles, but respectfully differ from them on the definition of Usury… My definition would include profiteering of all kinds, but exclude economic credit, the creature of modern banking and finance.”

Modern banking structures and financial instruments were introduced in Muslim countries at the time of their occupation by foreign Western powers, in the 19th and 20th Centuries. When Islamic jurists saw how these modern banking institutions and their assorted financial tools were used to develop the national economy, they understood the positive role that interest could play in modern society. They realized that its total prohibition in economic and financial dealings could conflict with society’s economic and social needs and aims, and could hamper the country’s development.

The voices of al-Azhar

For these reasons, from the 19th Century on, Egyptian Grand Muftis and Sheikhs of al-Azhar, as well as numerous religious leaders in various Muslim countries, have been earnestly looking for ways and means to convert the total prohibition of interest into a selective one, in order to reconcile the prevailing definition of riba with the economic and financial requirements of modern society.

Muhammad Abduh, the mufti of Egypt and Sheikh of al-Azhar, was a pioneer in this field, when he wrote a fatwa to the effect that interest paid by the Egyptian Post Office on “personal savings accounts” was lawful.

He also explained to the readers of “al-Manar” that the use of interest could be quite licit in some financial dealings, and have nothing to do with a riba situation. He wrote: “When one gives his money to another for investment, and payment of a known profit, this does not constitute the definitely forbidden Riba, regardless of the pre-specified profit rate… This type of transaction is beneficial both to the investor and the entrepreneur. In contrast, Riba harms one for no fault other than being in need, and benefits another for no work except greed and hardness of heart. The two types of dealings cannot possibly have the same legal status (hokum).”

Another Sheikh of al-Azhar, Mahmud Shaltut, wrote a fatwa in which he declared that interest paid on State bonds was licit, when issued by the State to meet public needs, and to further the country’s economic development. He even asserted that any transaction which was offered by the State, with a fixed interest in advance, was licit, since there was no exploitation of either party in such cases.

Muhammad Sayyed Tantawi, the present Sheikh of al-Azhar, though a traditional, orthodox scholar, worked for decades along the same lines as his predecessors, to try to disentangle interest from riba. As Grand Mufti of Egypt (1986-96), he ruled that fixed interests on bank deposits were “halal”, even suggesting that the legal terminology used for bank interest and bank accounts be changed, to avoid their assimilation to riba.

Furthermore, in 2002, the ulema of Al-Azhar, working under Tantawi’s direction, revised the 1965 stand of the institution on riba. They approved a fatwa which stated that “investing funds with banks that pre-specify profits or returns is permissible, and there is no harm therein.” For Tantawi: “…the bank investing the money for a pre-specified profit becomes a hired worker for the investors, who thus accept the amount the bank gives them as their profits, and all the excess profits (whatever they may be) are thus deemed the bank’s wages. Therefore, this dealing is devoid of riba.” He adds : “We do not find any Canonical Text, or convincing analogy, that forbids pre-specification of profits, as long as there is mutual consent.”

Bankers and shari’ah

One could quote many other efforts by distinguished Muslim jurists, aiming at separating interest from riba. For instance, Abd al Mun’im Al Nimr, a former Minister of Awqaf in Egypt, explained in a 1989 article that the prohibition of riba was essentially justified by the harm caused to the debtor. Therefore, since there was no harm caused to depositors in banks, the prohibition of riba did not apply to bank deposits.

Explains Nasr Farid Wasil, Tantawi’s successor as Grand Mufti of Egypt: “So long as banks invest the money in permissible venues (halal), then the transaction is permissible (halal)… The issue is an investment from money. Otherwise, it is forbidden (haram)…” He adds: “There is no such thing as an Islamic or non Islamic bank. So let us stop this controversy about bank interest.”

The banking debate revolves, therefore, essentially, around the definition of riba. A conservative definition of riba equates it with banking interest. On that basis, modern banking systems in Muslim countries are described as “illicit”, because they use interest in their operations.

But, according to a number of Grand Muftis of Egypt, and Sheikhs of Al-Azhar, this is an outdated view of the banking issue. In their opinion, riba should be equated with usury only. Since modern banking does not use usury in its operations, it is not concerned with the riba issue, and raises no problem of compliance with the shari’ah.

Explains Moroccan law professor Ahmed Khamlichi, in this respect: “The ulema don’t have the monopoly of interpretation of the shari’ah. Of course, they must rank high in consultations on shari’ah issues. [But] they don’t make the religious law, in the same way that it’s not the law professors who make the law, but the parliaments”.

Sovereign States have promulgated their own national codes, whose contents take into account the specifics of the country, which may differ considerably from one country to another, and over time. One shouldn’t be surprised, therefore, to discover that what’s licit in one country may be considered as illicit in another, and that the items in these categories may also change over time. The important thing to remember is that, in each country, it is the law of the land which applies, as defined by its national institutions. That’s what’s “licit” in that particular country, at that particular time.

Khalid Chraibi

SaudiDebate.com

Thursday, 07 June 2007

In his Regensburg lecture of September 12, 2006 Pope Benedict XVI argued that Islam, contrary to Christianity, had resorted to violence and coercion to spread its faith (1). Quoting a long-forgotten 14th century Byzantine emperor in support of his argument, the Pope commented: “The emperor must have known that surah 2 : 256 reads: “There is no compulsion in religion”. It is one of the surahs of the early period, when Muhammad was still powerless and under threat. But naturally the emperor also knew the instructions, developed later and recorded in the Qur’an, concerning holy war.”

The Pope then quoted the emperor as saying: “Show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached”.

The Pope’s derogatory remarks offended the Muslim community worldwide. Many media analysts saw in it the clear imprint of the Vatican’s campaign to disparage Islam, in order to counter its progress in developing countries.

The ulamas criticized the Pope for misrepresenting the facts concerning the Qur’anic verses he quoted, and for being clearly prejudiced in his discussion of Islamic thought and history.

They reminded him that the principle of religious freedom was enunciated in numerous Qur’anic verses, none of which was ever abrogated. Moreover, the Qur’an only prescribed Jihad to the Muslims as a defensive war to protect themselves and their faith when under attack.

The incident provided an opportunity for Muslims and non-Muslims alike to acquaint themselves with the Qur’an’s real stand on the issue of religious freedom.

The Qur’an proclaims the principle of religious freedom not in one, but in a multiplicity of verses, interspersed in many surahs, usually in the context of the discussion of the Messenger’s mission. The description of the latter sets out its scope, limits and contents, with indications as to how it is to be carried out, and how the Messenger is to deal with a variety of issues, including his nearest kinsmen, the People of the Book, the polytheists, etc. (2)

According to this description, the Messenger’s main function is to convey the Lord’s Message, to expound openly what he has been commanded and to give a clear warning to the people. He is “to invite all to the Way of the Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious.”

But, he is not set over people to arrange their affairs, and is not to overawe them by force. He can admonish them but, if they disobey him, he is to leave them alone, to their own choice. “Let him who will, believe, and let him who will, reject (it).” Or again: “Everyone acts according to his own disposition.” “Those who receive Guidance, do so for the good of their own souls; those who stray, do so to their own loss.”

This point is so important in the Qur’anic message that it is reiterated on several occasions, using different wordings: “If people accept guidance, they do it for the good of their own souls, and if any stray, the Messenger is only a Warner.”

“If any will see, it will be for [the good of] his own soul; if any will be blind, it will be to his own [harm]: the Messenger is not [here] to watch over their doings.” Thus, if he discusses the Lord’s Message with People of the Book and they dispute with him, the Messenger is to say to them: “Allah is our Lord and your Lord: for us [is the responsibility for] our deeds, and for you for your deeds, there is no contention between us and you.”

Similarly, “If people argue with him, dispute with him, charge him with falsehood, he is to say: ‘My work to me, and yours to you! Ye are free from responsibility for what I do and I for what ye do!’” In such situations, the Messenger is “to turn away from them, have patience with what they say, and leave them with noble [dignity].”

The Messenger is repeatedly reminded that: “If it were Allah’s Will, He could gather people together unto true guidance.”

“If it had been Allah’s Plan, they would not have taken false gods: but the Lord did not send the Messenger to watch over their doings, nor is he set over them to dispose of their affairs.”

The reason for the existence of religious freedom is explained in the following way: “If Allah had so willed, He would have made mankind a single People, but [His plan is] to test them in what He hath given them; so they must strive as in a race in all virtues.”

On one occasion, the Messenger is admonished in the following terms: “If it had been the Lord’s Will, they would all have believed, all who are on earth! Wilt thou then compel mankind, against their will, to believe!” The most-often quoted verse reads: “Let there be no compulsion in religion. Truth stands out clear from error [...].”

Contrary to the Pope’s assertion, this verse was not revealed in Makkah, in “the early period, when Muhammad was still powerless and under threat,” but in a later period, in al-Madinah, when the Messenger was in a situation of relative power and security.

The occasion is narrated in all tafsir textbooks: in pre-Islamic times, some women gave their child to a Jewish family to raise, often in the Jewish faith, in the belief that this would give him a better chance to survive. When the parents of such children converted to Islam, the children were reluctant to follow suit, so the Messenger was asked by the parents whether they could coerce their children into changing their faith. The verse quoted by the Pope forbade the parents to exercise any such coercion, stating: “Let there be no compulsion in religion.”

The Messenger is repeatedly reminded that, no matter what happens, it is not his role to punish anyone who rejects the Lord’s Message:”…thy duty is to make (the Message) reach them: it is Our part to call them to account.” “It is not for the Messenger, but for the Lord to make the decision whether to turn in Mercy to the unbelievers or to punish them. It will be for the Lord to call them to account.”

The Messenger is to “leave them alone until they encounter that Day of theirs, wherein they shall [perforce] swoon [with terror].”

Although the principle of religious freedom is thus perfectly established in the Qur’an, and was never abrogated, the Muslim communities have at times had difficulties in applying it, for all kinds of reasons.

As an illustration, Islamic jurists diverge to this day on how to deal with the issue of apostasy. Some consider that the Qur’anic principle of religious freedom covers the cases of apostasy, but most ulamas dispute that view, basing themselves on the Sunnah. Nevertheless, it remains as a fact that the Qur’an, while denouncing the people who commit apostasy, does not prescribe any sanction to be applied to them by any other person, as is clear from the following verses: “Those who believe, then reject Faith, then believe [again] and [again] reject Faith, and go on increasing in unbelief, Allah will not forgive them nor guide them on the way.” “Anyone who, after accepting Faith in Allah, utters Unbelief, – except under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in Faith – but such as open their breast to Unbelief, on them is Wrath from Allah, and theirs will be a dreadful Penalty.”

As to Jihad, the consensus of the ulamas today is that the Qur’an prescribes it to the Muslims only to defend themselves and their faith, when under attack. This appears explicitly in the following verses, which were the first revealed on the subject of Jihad: “To those against whom war is made, permission is given [to fight], because they are wronged; and verily, Allah is Most Powerful for their aid; [They are] those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right, [for no cause] except that they say, “Our Lord is Allah.” Did not Allah check one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which the name of Allah is commemorated in abundant measure. Allah will certainly aid those who aid His [cause]; for verily Allah is Full of Strength, Exalted in Might, [able to enforce His Will].”

The Qur’an never prescribes Jihad as an offensive war, to extend Islamic rule to foreign lands and to convert their people “by the sword”. Those who defend these views merely interpret Qur’anic verses in a manner which suits their own purposes. They are merely attributing to Islam their own views on the subject.

Based on the numerous rebuttals of the Pope’s assertions that were published by the ulamas in the media worldwide, one can draw the following conclusions:

The Qur’an proclaims the principle of religious freedom, explicitly and unequivocally, throughout dozens of different verses interspersed in a variety of surahs. It prescribes the use of dialogue and persuasion to transmit the Muslim message, and forbids the use of any form of coercion towards anyone to this end. This principle was upheld throughout the life of the Messenger and was applied to all, including the Muslim’s own children raised in the Jewish faith. As to Jihad, the Qur’an prescribes it to the Muslims only to defend themselves and their faith, when under attack.

Notes:

(1) Pope’s speech at University of Regensburg http://www.cwnews.com/news/viewstory.cfm?recnum=46474
(2) All Qur’anic quotations are from the Qur’an’s English translation at www.al-islam.com
(Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Islamic Affairs site) : http://quran.al-islam.com/Targama/DispTargam.asp?nType=1&nSeg=0&l=eng&nSora=1&nAya=1&t=eng

Khalid Chraibi

SaudiDebate.com

Saturday, 28 July 2007

Watching TV news programmes these days, one gets the impression that the whole Middle East is in turmoil, with terrible acts of violence taking place routinely in a multiplicity of settings. The distress is at its peak in Iraq where, every single day, trucks and cars laden with explosives are rammed into crowded places, such as a central market or a mosque at the time of the midday prayer, and detonated, killing dozens of civilians and wounding hundreds of people.

This wave of violence is only marginally directed at foreign troops of occupation. The overwhelming majority of the victims are civilians who are not even individually targeted, but simply belong to a group that their adversaries have decided to attack, such as the employees of some administration, or the members of a religious group (Sunni or Shi’a). Many of the victims are accounted for merely as “collateral damage”, i.e. people who happened to be standing within the range of an explosive device, at the time of explosion.

The authors of these acts of violence proudly describe themselves as “jihadists”, “salafi”, etc. to underline their Islamic affiliations. Based on this, Western governments and media lump all these acts together under the generic label of “terrorism”, attributing them to a resurgence of religious extremism in the Muslim world. They either present them as symbols of an ongoing “clash of civilizations” between Islamic countries and the West, or point at them as an indication of the struggle between conservatism and modernity in Muslim societies.

Nevertheless, most Muslims find it hard to reconcile these acts of violence with the teachings of their religion. But, the political/religious leaders who mastermind such actions have developed their own “fatwas” about them, which they use to convince would-be suicide-bombers of the righteousness of their acts of violence.

They justified their actions as follows, in a recent interview published by a major American newspaper: “In the typical car bombing, God will identify those who deserve to die – for example, anyone helping the enemy – and send them to hell. The other victims will go to paradise. ‘The innocent who is hurt, he won’t suffer. He becomes a martyr himself’.” (1)

Nor, do they feel any distress about the random killing of children in such operations, because “Children receive special consideration in death. They are not held accountable for any sins until puberty, and if they are killed in a jihad operation they will go straight to heaven. There, they will instantly age to their late 20s, and enjoy the same access to virgins and other benefits as martyrs receive.” (1)

Many Saudi youth have been associated, in recent years, with this type of violence, in such diverse settings as Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, North Africa, etc. The Saudi authorities are worried about this situation, and try to develop new guidelines to provide the youth with the appropriate religious guidance, including within the environment of summer camps this summer, to enable them to distinguish between true Islamic teachings and “deviant ideology”.

Thus, at a meeting with more than 600 imams and khateebs in late June 2007, Saudi Interior Minister Prince Naif expressed his concern about Saudi youth involvement in acts of violence in Iraq and Lebanon. He was quoted by the Saudi Press Agency as asking the imams, and beyond them Saudi society more generally: “Do you know that your children who go to Iraq are used only for blowing themselves up, causing the deaths of innocents? Are you happy for your children to become instruments of murder?” He’s reported to have added: “Do you want people in your society who call you, your state and your leaders infidels?”

The Prince emphasized the positive role that imams and khateebs could play in the country’s fight against terrorism, “deviant ideology” and destructive thoughts and ideas, by regularly using the Friday sermon in over 14 000 mosques to expose the “deviants” and their ideology.

In theory, the task of the imams and khateebs is quite straightforward and simple.

They have to explain to Saudi youth that Islam is based on the respect of life and property, freedom, equality, solidarity and justice for all. It is the religion of “ummat al wassatt” (the community of the Just, or of the Middle position) as explained in the following verse: “Thus have We made of you an Ummat justly balanced, that ye might be witnesses over the nations, and the Messenger a witness over yourselves;…” (Al-Baqarah II:143)

Islam opposes extremism in religion, as explained in the verse: “Say: O People of the Book! exceed not in your religion the bounds (of what is proper), trespassing beyond the truth, nor follow the vain desires of people who went wrong in times gone by, who misled many, and strayed (themselves) from the even Way.” (Al-Maidah, V:77)

The Prophet also warned repeatedly and strongly against extremism in religion, emphasizing that it was the cause of the disasters which befell earlier nations.

Thus, Islam abhors the indiscriminate killing of civilians and non-combatants. The high value that Islam places on human life is clearly expressed in a multiplicity of Kor’anic verses such as: “…take not life, which Allah hath made sacred, except by way of justice and law: thus doth He command you, that ye may learn wisdom.” (Al-An’am, VI:151)

Or: “if anyone slew a person – unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land – it would be as if he slew the whole people: and if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people.” (Al-Maidah V:32)

The principle of sacredness of human life is also emphasized in the “Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights” of 19 September 1981 (21 Dhul Qaidah 1401) which states: “Human life is sacred and inviolable and every effort shall be made to protect it. In particular no one shall be exposed to injury or death, except under the authority of the Law.”

Islam also established very strict rules on how to deal with cases of murder. Capital punishment can be applied by a court of law, which respects due process. But, no individual is allowed to take the law into his own hands, to decide at his personal whim who is to live and who is to die, etc. Such a situation, if it were to take place, would be comparable to a state of “fitna”, which is strongly denounced by Islam. The Muslim community is organized to handle and resolve all the conflicts between its members through peaceful means, or using the alternative means which the shari’ah has established.

The imams are also to remind the youth that, even in a situation of warfare, Islam has established very strict rules, which all parties to the conflict have to respect. These rules were observed during the life of the Prophet, with the objective of ensuring that damages were limited to what was necessary, without unnecessary destruction of life (women, civilians, old people, non-fighters) and property (trees, orchards, wells, cattle, etc.).

The Caliph Abu Bakr reminded his troops of these rules, on the eve of their departure for battle, as follows:

“Stop, O people, that I may give you ten rules for your guidance in the battlefield. Do not commit treachery or deviate from the right path. You must not mutilate dead bodies. Neither kill a child, nor a woman, nor an aged man. Bring no harm to the trees, nor burn them with fire, especially those which are fruitful. Slay not any of the enemy’s flock, save for your food. You are likely to pass by people who have devoted their lives to monastic services; leave them alone.”

It is clear from the preceding statements that Islam is definitely opposed to the indiscriminate killing of people, no matter what the circumstances may be.

It also stands against takfeer, which is another aspect of extremism. Clearly, one cannot say on a whim that other Muslim people are “kouffar” (infidels) who can therefore be killed without any misgivings. This would be the most extreme case of “fitna”. Resort to violence, even at the State level, is the exception and not the rule. It must take place within strict rules: no abuse of power, no excess, respect of non-combatants (civilians, women, children, elderly…), respect of private property, which must not be destroyed except in extreme situations… One can’t say, in this respect, that he wants to promote the values and principles of Islam, while he violates himself all its fundamental rules to achieve his own political objectives.

In short, in a modern State, people cannot take the law into their own hands. Individuals can’t declare war to foreign States. Nor can they declare war to their own established Government. Otherwise, the community enters into a situation of anarchy, of “fitna”.

The confusion between politics, religion and “fitna” is promoted by all the parties concerned in the conflicts raging in the Middle East, because it fits with each participant’s agenda. Western Governments and media can point to the violence and explain it by religious extremism, so that they don’t have to delve into the complex political conflicts taking place in Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, etc. The political authorities of a country can explain the violence as the product of “religious extremism” or of a “deviant” ideology, rather than as a rebellion against their authority. The “jihadists” can claim that they are merely trying to achieve the objective of a unified “ummah” set by Islam, rather than the political objectives they truly have in mind, such as the conquest of power in a given country.

The people at large may be left bewildered by all these conflicting claims. But, the unquestionable fact is that Islam is the religion of “ummat al wassatt” (the nation of the Just people, or the people of the Middle position) which abhors all acts of extremism in any aspect of life. In particular, Islam is based on the respect of life and property, freedom, equality, solidarity and justice for all. One can’t do away with all the values it stands for, and everything it teaches, and still assert with any credibility that he’s acting on its behalf.

Notes:

(1) Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet: ‘The Guidebook For Taking A Life’, The New York Times, Week in Review, June 10, 2007)

By Khalid Chraibi

ArabLife.org

Tuesday, 22 January 2008

In a memorable scene in Ingmar Bergman’s movie Wild Strawberries, Isak, the central character, dreams that he is standing in court, waiting to be sentenced. But he has no clue as to the charges against him. When the judge declares him guilty, he asks, bewildered: “Guilty of what?” The judge replies flatly: “You are guilty of guilt”. “Is that serious?” asks Isak. “Unfortunately,” replies the judge.

The verdict in the case of the ‘Girl of Qatif’, as the incident has become known worldwide, is as bewildering to most people as the judge’s verdict was to Isak. How can a young bride of 18 who has been subjected to the harrowing experience of being blackmailed by a former ‘telephone boyfriend’, then gang-raped 14 times in a row by seven unknown assailants, be further brought to trial for the offence of khalwa and condemned to 90 lashes? How does one justify raising the punishment to 200 lashes and 6 months in jail when she appealed the first sentence?

The case had all the necessary ingredients to become an instant cause célèbre, when word of it reached the global news agencies. It received very large coverage in the media, with the verdict being criticized by commentators, politicians and citizens in all walks of life, within the region and in far away countries.

Amnesty International protested against the flogging verdict (which was also applicable to the men involved in the case), observing that “the use of corporal punishment constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment.” It added that “the criminalisation of khalwa is inconsistent with international human rights standards, in particular, an individual’s right to privacy.” The sentence against the ‘Girl of Qatif’ and the boy who sat with her in the car “should therefore be declared null and void”.

The Saudi authorities were perplexed and incensed by such criticisms. As far as they were concerned, the court sentence against the ‘Girl of Qatif’ was made in application of the Shari’ah as it has traditionally been interpreted in the country, and raised no particular or unusual issues.

The Saudi Ministry of Justice observed, in a statement, that the girl went out to meet her male acquaintance “without a mahram, a legal guardian, and exchanged with him forbidden affairs through the illegal khalwa. She knows that khalwa with an unrelated man is forbidden by Shari’ah and by doing this she has broken the sacred matrimonial contract.” Her punishment is thus perfectly justified in Islamic law.

But, the ‘Girl of Qatif’, her husband and her lawyer questioned several points in the Ministry’s statement, as well as the legal grounds on which the sentence was based.

According to them, the girl had not put herself in this situation of khalwa out of her own free will. She and the boy who was raped with her had been chatting regularly on the phone for two years, since they were both 16, but without meeting. Somehow, the boy obtained her picture. When she got married at age 18, she wanted her picture back, and the boy agreed to do that, if she met him in his car, in a public mall. After returning her picture to her, the boy volunteered to drive her home but, on their way, they were overtaken by another car, which compelled them to stop. They were kidnapped and taken to a deserted place, where the boy and the girl were separately subjected to a gang-rape.

The girl’s husband insisted that there was no adultery involved in this case, nor was there any sexually-oriented activity between the couple in the car. The meeting only took place to allow the girl to retrieve her picture which, moreover, was harmless and did not show her in any compromising position. In his opinion, it had been bad judgment on the part of the girl to go to this meeting, but there was nothing more to it.

The lawyer of the ‘Girl of Qatif’, Abdul Rahman al-Lahem, argued, for his part, that there was no khalwa between the girl and the ex-boyfriend, in the legal sense, “because they met in a public place”. Moreover, the boy was trying to blackmail the girl with the picture, and she wanted to retrieve it… She was forced to meet him in a “khalwa”, which invalidates the rule of “personal will” in Shariah. As Saudi jurists agree, the legal definition of khalwa doesn’t apply to the situation when a person is in dire need to attend such a meeting, or does so under duress.

The Saudi judiciary accepted to review the case, but before it began looking into it, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah decided, on December 17, to pardon the ‘Girl of Qatif’, bringing the dramatic story of this girl to a compassionate ending.

Despite this humane conclusion to the case, many Muslims would agree with Amnesty International, that “the criminalisation of ‘Khalwa’ is inconsistent with international human rights standards, in particular, an individual’s right to privacy.”

Of course, if any human rights organization in the area were to present the political/religious authorities of the Gulf States with a proposal to suppress any sanctions for khalwa, they would reject it out of hand, on the grounds that it was “inconsistent” with Muslim law. But this only demonstrates the important differences which continue to exist between Muslim countries in their interpretation of the prescriptions of the Shari’ah.

Everybody agrees that there are no Qur’anic verses which forbid khalwa, or define any sanction applicable to it. The main text of reference on the subject is a hadith of the Messenger, which states:

“’Whosoever believes in Allah and the Last Day, let him not be alone with a woman who has not a Mahram (male relative who she cannot marry) with her. Indeed, the third (person) is al-Shaytan!” [Ahmad].

This hadith implies that, when a man and a woman are alone in a secluded place, there may be temptation lurking. But, at the same time, Islam teaches moral responsibility and individual accountability, underlining the fact that each person is individually responsible for their actions before God.

Therefore, in North African countries, for example, the hadith on khalwa is viewed as merely indicating ethics of conduct, in order to avoid committing sins of the flesh. Some people may frown on a situation of khalwa but, as long as no fault has been committed there is no reason to apply any sanction. Punishment is only called for when actions which are forbidden by law actually take place, such as adultery, prostitution, and the like.

In other countries, such as the Gulf States, the hadith has been interpreted by the ulema as forbidding khalwa. But, even in that case, the Messenger did not define any punishment to be applied to those who put themselves in such a situation. It was the ulema, through their own ijtihad – their personal reflection – over the centuries, who studied the ‘offence’ in its various aspects, defined its nature and decided on the applicable sanctions (under the ta’azir approach, in which the judge has latitude to decide on the applicable sanction).

When a case such as that of the ‘Girl of Qatif’ gains worldwide publicity, most Muslim people find themselves at a loss to understand why different Muslim countries, applying the same Islamic law, implement it with such strikingly different results. How can the same action be a punishable offence that is severely sanctioned in one region, whereas in another region it is no offence at all, and carries no punishment?

The situation becomes even more perplexing when a Saudi judge explains, in an interview published by a major Saudi daily newspaper, that the Courts have shown “compassion and pity” for the girl (when she was condemned to 90 lashes, later raised to 200 lashes plus 6 months in jail). If that had not been the case, it was his opinion, as a judge with 30 years experience, that the judges “should have condemned the girl of Qatif to death”, together with the other people involved in the case.(1)

One is reminded of Ali ibn Abu Talib’s observation that it is human beings (with all their frailties) who interpret the Shari’ah. In the Gulf States, personal status law has not yet been codified into a mudawwana, and both the judges and the people have some difficulty at times, distinguishing between tribal ‘law’ and customs and the prescriptions of Islamic law, especially in ta’azir situations.

One would think, in these conditions, that there is latitude for change in the judicial system’s view of khalwa in the Gulf States, if the political authorities were inclined to do so. The only major obstacle to be confronted is the weight of traditions.

“Unfortunately,” says Suhaila Hammad, a writer who supports women’s rights, “tradition and customs control many people here (in Saudi Arabia) and they confuse them with Islamic law. As for the argument that we should introduce women’s rights gradually, I say Islam came 1,428 years ago. Are all these centuries not enough to understand it?” (2)

Notes:

(1) Okaz newspaper, Nov 27, 2007 : an interview with judge Ibrahim al-Khodhairi (in Arabic)

(2) Heba Saleh, ‘Women’s rights: Barrier of silence has been broken’, Financial Times, December 4, 2007